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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
("Act") signalled the beginning of a new era for United States immigra-
tion law.1 The first major revision of the nation's immigration policy in
twenty-one years, the Act has had, and will continue to have, a profound
impact both within the United States and abroad. The Act caused an
extraordinary surge of apprehension and confusion in foreign communi-
ties and domestic workplaces, and has already produced dramatic effects
throughout the world barely a year after its passage.
The controversy centers on the Act's four main components: em-
ployer sanctions;2 amnesty;3 temporary agricultural worker programs;
4
and increased enforcement.' In summary, the employer sanction provi-
sions make it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire any undocu-
mented alien. Penalties range up to a maximum of a jail term and/or a
$10,000 fine per unauthorized alien.' Also directed at employers are a
series of anti-discrimination provisions established to deter discrimina-
I Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1150-24 (Supp.
1987))(signed into law Nov. 6, 1986). Success in the passage of the United States Immigration and
Control Act of 1986 ("Act") is owed to the efforts of Senator Alan Simpson, who has been the
"nation's most persistent advocate" of immigration law overhaul for the last six years. Victory on
Bill Sweetfor Tall, Tough Senator, Hous. Chron., Oct. 19, 1986, § 1, at 24, col. 4. Supporters of the
bill were also aided by the increasing public concern about undocumented aliens (1.8 million were
apprehended in 1986) and the weariness of some of the bill's opponents. Hispanics and business
representatives, believing passage was inevitable, devoted their efforts to tailor the legislation more to
their liking. Id. For an excellent analysis of the prior immigration reform bill ("Simpson-Mazzoli")
that failed to win passage, see Comment, Employer Sanctions for Hiring Illegal Aliens: 4 Simplistic
Solution to a Complex Problem, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203 (1984).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
3 Id. § 1255a.
4 Id. §§ 1160, 1161, 1186.
5 Id. § 1524(a)(1).
6 Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (e)(4), (f)(1). "Unauthorized alien" refers to an alien not lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence, or an alien not authorized by this Act or by the Attorney General to
be so employed. .d. § 1324a(h)(3).
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tion in the workplace towards United States citizens and legal aliens.7
The amnesty section provides a one-year period, beginning May 5, 1987,
for undocumented aliens who entered the United States prior to January
1, 1982, to apply for legal status.8 The agricultural worker programs
allow employers to hire undocumented aliens in temporary or seasonal
agricultural services when legal workers are unavailable. Lastly, the en-
forcement program envisions an increase in enforcement activities by
50%.9
Each component of the Act was envisaged as vital to the success of
the others. Congress expected to curtail the influx of undocumented
aliens into the United States economy through employer sanctions and
increased enforcement. At the same time, Congress sought to mitigate
the impact on certain undocumented aliens and employers through am-
nesty and agricultural worker programs.' ° However, though the plan
appears to establish an immigration control system, it only "send[s] out a
false statement" that Congress has solved the undocumented immigra-
tion dilemma."
Although the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 has ex-
perienced limited success in a number of areas, it will not accomplish its
goals overall. It has threatened United States foreign relations with
Latin American countries and negatively affected their economies. It has
impacted on Canada's immigration policy and resulted in the tightening
of Canada's refugee program. Although promising in theory, the am-
nesty provisions will not achieve their objectives. Moreover, the Act has
caused administrative difficulties in the United States business sector due
to the documentation required to avoid employer sanctions.
Both business and agriculture are experiencing significant labor
shortages in certain areas. However, the shortages do not reflect the suc-
cess of employer sanctions. Rather, they demonstrate a temporary lull in
7 Id. § 1324b; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986) [hereinafter HOUSE
CONF. REP.].
8 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A).
9 Id. §§ 1160, 1161, 1186, 1524(a)(1).
10 The logic behind the plan is that the approximately 2.1 million undocumented aliens present
in the United States will no longer displace United States citizens in the work force nor burden the
economy. Cf. P. CAFFERTY, THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 76-80 (1983); Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of Census and Population of the House Comm. of Post Office and Civil Service,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 134, 146 (1985)[hereinafter Census and Population](testimony of Associate
Professor Teresa A. Sullivan, University of Texas at Austin). Productivity levels, consumption pat-
terns, and stimulation of the economy by undocumented workers have not been researched, leading
to untested conclusions about them. See S. WEINTRAUB, THE USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES BY UN-
DOCUMENTED ALIENS IN TEXAS: A STUDY OF STATE COSTS AND REVENUES (1984).
11 Uehling, Trying to Reform the Border, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1986, at 32, 35.
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undocumented immigration that will end once the demand for labor in
the United States, and the push of poverty and political upheaval in for-
eign countries, overcome the fear of sanctions for breaking the law. Once
this lull dissipates, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
will again be unable to control illegal immigration. Further, the wide
range of litigation associated with the Act will cause frustration through-
out the United States as well as abroad.
II. FOREIGN POLICY
A. Latin America
Latin American countries consider the passage of the Act "tanta-
mount to a foreign-policy declaration" by the United States. In particu-
lar, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras fear that the law
will lead to massive deportations. Such deportations would worsen these
countries' already severe unemployment and eliminate a primary source
of foreign revenue through the funds undocumented workers send to
their families in their homelands.12 These fears are substantial, consider-
ing the fact that about 70% of the six million undocumented aliens in the
United States come from Latin America.
13
In Mexico, the nation expected to be affected most severely, the un-
employment rate currently is estimated at 40%.14 Mexico's second larg-
est source of foreign revenue is believed to be the money sent back home
by Mexican workers living in the United States.15 The fears that these
figures will be adversely affected have already turned into reality. For
example, Ocampo, Mexico, located in the middle of the Mexican farm
belt, was noted for an economy that had been functioning successfully for
years. One-fourth of its population worked in the United States and sent
back over three-fourths of the town's wealth.16 After the passage of the
Act, however, the northward flow of immigrants slowed tremendously,
12 Latin Nations, Fearing Mass Deportation, Seek to Lessen Impact of New U.S. Immigration
Law, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 50, col. 1 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Latin Nations]. Even Latin
American nations with few undocumented aliens in the United States, such as Costa Rica, are in fear
that the return of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan undocumented aliens to the South after their failure to
find work will increase the number of these refugees already in their countries. Id.
13 Approximately 20% of El Salvador's population resides in the United States, most illegally.
Id.
14 Id. To keep its population employed, Mexico would require one million new jobs per year.
New U.S. Migrants Law Vexes Mexicans, Wall St. J., June 19, 1987, at 14, col. 1 (Midwest ed.)
[hereinafter New US. Migrants].
15 New U.S. Migrants, supra note 14.
16 Id. The households on the communal farms could easily be distinguished: those whose
breadwinners worked in the United States lived in adobe houses and drove pickup trucks with
United States license plates, while the others lived in wooden shacks. Id.
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the flow of funds from the United States decreased, and sales of at least
one business were off by one-third.
17
Ocampo is one example of the existing economic threat to Mexico.
The closure of the "safety valve" to the North only adds to the economic
pressure on a nation "already burdened by foreign debt, unemploy-
ment... poverty, social isolation, overpopulation and the imminent dan-
ger that arable lands will be pulverized even more."18 Mexico is only one
of a number of Latin American nations faced with these problems.
To reduce the detrimental impact of the Act, Latin American coun-
tries have attempted to challenge the Act or plea for help.19 Mexico has
sought the aid of regional Mexican-American leaders in the United
States in the hope of fostering a joint effort to repeal the employer sanc-
tion provisions.20 Similarly, Central American nations are attempting to
gain support in Washington for temporary refugee status for some un-
documented aliens.21 The United States government, however, has
stated that the prospects for special consideration for one country are
very slim because such exemptions would undercut the Act and lead
other nations to expect similar treatment.22
However, the majority of Latin American nations are reluctant to
challenge the new law and lobby for amendments because noninterven-
tion has always been a fundamental principle of their foreign policy.
17 Id.
18 Id. It should be noted that one potential hope for Mexico is the "Maquila Industry." A twin-
plant system established along the Mexico-United States border allows "non-Mexican companies to
set up assembly plants in Mexico and manufacture there for immediate export ...." The approxi-
mately 900 factories established so far have attracted a sizable number of suppliers and transport
companies on the United States side of the border. At this point, however, although rapid employ-
ment growth can be seen on the United States side of the border, the system has yet to make a
notable impact on the unemployment situation in Mexico. Depressed Texas-Border Cities Adding
Jobs at Healthy Rates, Wall St. J., March 17, 1987, at 37, col. I (Midwest ed.).
19 Latin Nations, supra note 12. According to Mexico's Consul General Hermilo Lopez-Bassols,
the United States' right to legislate is not questioned, except when it affects the interests of other
nations, at which time the issue becomes international and demands consultations and negotiations.
Id.
20 Id.; see infra note 131 and accompanying text. Mexico also promises to publish a "black list"
of unscrupulous attorneys and consultants. Latin Nations, supra note 12.
21 Guatemala tried to organize a meeting of five Central American nations to address the law,
and its President, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, spoke with President Ronald W. Reagan. Latin Nations,
supra note 12.
22 For example, the increase in the number of Latin American nations pleading for stays in
deportation may lessen the chance for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans to win "extended voluntary
departure" ("EVD") status. An argument can be made, however, that El Salvador and Nicaragua
are in a different class than other Latin American nations because they are at war. Their situations,
therefore, more closely approximate those in Poland, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, where EVD status
has already been extended. Id.
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Moreover, it is believed that because they have entered the arena so re-
luctantly, any efforts may be futile.23
B. Canada
While the new law has placed Latin American nations in a tenuous
situation, it has also impacted the Canadian government. Canada is en-
countering a mass migration of foreign undocumented aliens who, fear-
ing deportation from the United States, are seeking asylum in Canada.
From January to February of 1987, an unprecedented 6,000 people came
to Canada to make refugee claims, one-third of the entire number for
1986.24 Almost half the claims were made by undocumented
Guatemalans and Salvadorans from the United States.25 In response,
Canada implemented emergency measures, effective February 20, 1987,
to counter the influx.26
Canada, which previously maintained a liberal policy allowing refu-
gees to stay in Canada until their claims were heard, decided to turn back
all undocumented aliens to the United States until their claims had been
heard by a Canadian immigration panel. 'The United States, in turn,
agreed not to deport these aliens until their hearings were completed.27
In addition, Canada canceled a policy that allowed people from eighteen
strife-ridden countries, including Guatemala and El Salvador, to stay and
work in Canada.28
III. AMNESTY
Amnesty, the act of granting a pardon to a group of individuals, 29
has been unsuccessful thus far in bringing undocumented aliens forward.
The amnesty provision of the Act was a concession to Hispanic lobbying
forces represented by Democrats in Congress. 0 It represented an at-
23 Id.
24 Canada Tightens Its Policy on Refugees After Claimants Rise Tied to US. Law, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 23, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Canada]. In 1986, total immigration was
100,000 with 16,000 refugees accepted. The tightened measures would reduce refugee claims to
25,000 in 1987, compared with a projected 50,000 without the changes. Canada's population is
approximately 22,000,000. Id.
25 Id.
26 121 Can. Gaz. (pt. 2) 777 (1987); see Canada, supra note 24.
27 Canada hopes this policy will encourage aliens to "claim refugee status at Canadian embas-
sies," where they can be "judged on a case-by-case basis" instead of at the border. Canada, supra
note 24.
28 Id.
29 THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 40 (1974).
30 Uehling, supra note 11, at 35. See also Wilentz, Harvest of Confusion, TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at
28.
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tempt to "wipe the slate clean" and ease the impact of employer sanc-
tions and the enforcement program on undocumented aliens.
A one-year application period began on May 5, 1987, for undocu-
mented aliens to attempt to gain temporary residence status.31  Each
alien must prove, through documentation and independent corrobora-
tion,32 that he or she has lived in the United States continuously at least
since January 1, 1982.33 Thereafter, he or she can achieve permanent
residence status during a one year application period beginning approxi-
mately eighteen months after temporary status is granted.34
The INS expected approximately two million to four million un-
documented aliens to apply for amnesty.35 As of July 7, 1987, however,
only 213,000 aliens had applied; the INS has conceded that this number
was well below the expected level. The reasons for the slow start are
numerous. 36 The INS attributes the problem to the lack of information
in the communities and in government-selected "go between" groups
called Qualified Designated Entities ("QDEs").37 The INS complains
that it has received fewer than one application a day from the QDEs
because they are overdocumenting cases and "spending too much time
processing them."38 The QDEs, on the other hand, attribute the prob-
31 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A).
32 Employment-related documents, not only from the employer, are the "best evidence" of con-
tinuous residence, and corroboration "may be in the form of affidavits." HOUSE CONF. REP., supra
note 7, at 92.
33 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a)(1)(C), (2)(A). The Senate version made January 1, 1980, the cutoff date.
HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 92. Additional requirements include, inter alia, establishing
that the alien is admissible as an immigrant and has not been convicted of any felony, or three or
more misdemeanors, in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a)(4)(A), (B).
34 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(A). With certain exceptions, permanent status will be granted if the
alien maintains the requirements for temporary status and establishes or is actively pursuing a mini-
mum understanding of English and United States history and government. Id. §§ 1255a(b)(1)(B)-
(D), (2). In all cases the Attorney General has the right to approve an application for humanitarian
purposes, public interest purposes, or to assure family unity. Id. § 1255a(d)(2)(B).
Numerical limitations for eligibility, however, do not exist, but if the Attorney General deter-
mines that an alien is ineligible, his temporary residence status will terminate at the end of the thirty-
first month of such status. Id. §§ 1255a(b)(2), (d)(1). Review is very limited, with no review for late
filings, only a single level of administrative appellate review, and only judicial review if an order of
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a (1970 & Supp. 1987) is involved. Id. §§ 1255a(f)(2), (3)(A),
(4)(A).
35 Latin Nations, supra note 12.
36 Amnesty For Immigrants Moves Slowly, Wall St. J., July 7, 1987, at 6, col. I (Midwest ed.)
[hereinafter Amnesty For Immigrants].
37 Over 800 agencies were selected by the government to act as official Qualified Designated
Entities ("QDEs") to offer help and provide a buffer between the immigrants and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS"). Id.; 52 Fed. Reg. 16,200 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 210.1(m)).
38 Amnesty For Immigrants, supra note 36. The INS reports that private lawyers are submitting
more applications than the QDEs. Id.
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lem to the lack of cooperation by the INS and the fact that the INS has
not established firm guidelines on crucial policies.3 9 However, the failure
of the amnesty plan is the result of many factors."
These facts include the widespread confusion regarding the amnesty
provisions, which has resulted from the lack of firm INS guidelines.41
Major uncertainty exists over proper documentation. The INS has not
specified exactly how many documents are required, and aliens are un-
sure of the consequences if they cannot document their stay due to the
loss of-or lack of-information.42 Many have been living in fear of be-
ing identified and deported. Now they "must come up with all the docu-
mentation they have tried for so long to escape: tax, rent, heating and
telephone bills, pay slips, W-2 forms."43
Aliens who have tried to live invisible lives dealing on a cash basis
will have trouble providing extensive documentation, since even United
States citizens have trouble gathering documents dating back five years.'
Moreover, numerous employers have added to this documentation di-
lemma by refusing to provide affidavits documenting the years of work
by the aliens, for fear of Internal Revenue Service prosecution for off-
the-book cash wage payments.45 Even assuming aliens succeeded in get-
ting documentation, there would be no guarantee that it would be found
valid, considering the potential for forged documents.46 The Act conse-
quently exposes not only ineligible undocumented aliens to the risk of
deportation, but also those who cannot establish that they arrived before
January 1, 1982. 4'
Another major point of confusion and concern centers on whether
family members will be permitted to stay in the United States when only
39 Id.; see infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
40 See Flores, My Father Crossed the Border and Gave Us a Future, Wall St. J., July 29, 1987, at
14, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
41 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36.
42 Id.; see Flores, supra note 40.
43 Wilentz, supra note 30, at 28.
44 Id.
45 New Immigration Law Brings Much Anxiety to US. Workplaces, Wall St. J., June 5, 1987, at
1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.) [hereinafter New Immigration Law]. Most employers are unaware that the
new law prevents the INS from informing the Internal Revenue Service. Id.; see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,
223 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(4)).
46 INS Seeks to Force Employers to Check Workers' Status Within 1 Day of Hiring, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 21, 1987, at 46, col. 2 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Workers'Status]. In Houston, for example, the
INS found it takes an hour to get a forged set of the necessary documents. Uehling, supra note 11, at
32. In June 1987, birth certificates were selling in El Paso for $80, and passports for $200. New
Immigration Law, supra note 45, at 1, col. 6.
47 Wilentz, supra note 30, at 28.
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one member qualifies for amnesty.4" It is estimated that as many as 25%
of the prospective applicants are from families in which only one parent
may qualify for amnesty.49 Although three bills are now pending in Con-
gress which would keep families united even if not all the members qual-
ify,50 there are no guarantees. Many aliens as well as many QDEs are
holding back applications until the issue is resolved. 1
An additional point of controversy centers on the fact that the appli-
cation requires listing of all next of kin, including those who reside in the
United States illegally and who do not qualify for amnesty. 2 Policies are
unsettled as to the actions that will be taken against the individuals
listed, causing the aliens to refrain from applying due to the fear of ex-
posing others to deportation.
The factors underlying the failure of the amnesty plan, however, ex-
tend far beyond the confusion. The significant time and money required
to process applications are also a great hindrance. While the INS pro-
jected a time expenditure of two hours per case, the QDEs are finding
that simple cases can take twelve hours, and complex cases over twenty
hours to process.53 The additional time adds additional expenses:
although the INS anticipated each case would cost $200, simple cases
actually cost as much as $350.54 High fees discourage aliens from com-
ing forward.
Another problem lies in the fact that the QDEs are encountering
difficulties in finding and training staff and in communicating with the
clients. Consequently, prospective clients have been prompted to go else-
where or directly to the INS.55 Proper communication is essential be-
cause the applications are printed entirely in English,56 which many
clients cannot read.
Regardless of whether the INS and the QDEs can overcome these
48 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36. The Attorney General does have the power to ap-
prove an application to assure family unity. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B); see supra note 35 and accom-
panying text.
49 Immigration Amnesty Begins Smoothly But with Much Anxiety for Immigrants, Wall St. J.,
May 6, 1987, § 2, at 52, col. 1 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Immigration Amnesty Begins].
50 Id.
51 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36.
52 Immigration Amnesty Begins, supra note 49; see 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(C).
53 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36. The extra time spent can be attributed in part to the
confusion around the amnesty provision. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
54 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36; see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,193 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.7(b)). Aliens who prefer to seek private counsel may expect bills in the thousands of dollars.
The Immigration Law's Harvest, Wall St. J., June 17, 1987, at 22, col. 1 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter
Harvest].
55 Amnesty for Immigrants, supra note 36.
56 Immigration Amnesty Begins, supra note 49.
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problems, a more difficult obstacle to surmount is the aliens' widespread
distrust of "the system." Aliens who have always avoided contact with
the government have difficulty believing that the amnesty plan is not a
clever way to round them up and deport them." Many aliens, therefore,
are waiting to see what happens to their peers who do apply.58
The final problem with the amnesty plan centers on the fact that
most undocumented aliens will not meet the criteria. Overlooked was
the fact that the majority of Central American war and economic refu-
gees fled their homelands after 1981, and therefore, many of them will
not qualify for amnesty. 9
Thus, even though the new law provides a tremendous opportunity
that may never come again, the opportunity cannot be taken advantage
of due to difficulties with the plan's implementation. Furthermore, since
each of the four main components are closely interrelated, the difficulties
with the amnesty component impact on the other provisions.
IV. EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
A. Documentation Process
The employer sanction provisions are one of the most perplexing
areas of the new Act. The provisions make it unlawful for any person or
entity knowingly to hire, recruit, or refer for a fee an undocumented alien
after November 6, 1986.60 The premise underlying this rule is that since
most undocumented aliens have entered the United States to work, the
one entity with whom they must have contact is the employer. The Act,
therefore, shifts the burden of enforcing immigration laws on the em-
ployer.61 This burden includes the employer's examining any one of a
57 At Freddy's Cafe, Cuisine Is Mexican, Clientele Is Nervous, Wall St. J., June 15, 1987, at 1, col.
4 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Freddy's Cafe].
58 Immigration Amnesty Begins, supra note 49. Some undocumented aliens believe that only the
rich with connections will succeed in obtaining amnesty, and therefore they will not even contem-
plate coming forward. Freddy's Cafe, supra note 57.
59 Latin Nations, supra note 12. Many refugees have fled to Canada because they cannot meet
the qualifying time period for amnesty. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
60 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). The Senate version penalized employers who referred for a fee,
"or other consideration," but this phrase was removed to allow employers to rely on such referrals
for compliance without violating any "contrary contractual provisions with union hiring halls."
HousE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 85. Each subdivision of an entity that does its own hiring,
recruiting, or referring for employment is considered a separate person or entity. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(e)(4). Included are those who use a contract, subcontract, or exchange, knowingly to obtain
labor of an undocumented alien when the agreement was entered into, renegotiated, or extended
after the enactment date. Id. § 1324a(a)(4).
61 p. CAFFERTY, supra note 10, at 186. Placing such responsibility on an employer (as opposed
to a landlord, grocer, or utility company) is a questionable choice. Undocumented aliens do enter
the United States to work, but such employment incentives would disappear if the aliens were unable
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number of proper documents,62 filling out an 1-9 form, signing it, and
having an employee attest to its accuracy by signature.63
Although this system appears simple, confusion has resulted due to
changing regulations, lack of information, and lack of crucial policies.
The first area of confusion centers on the fact that the INS changed the
enforcement date of the sanctions. The sanctions were scheduled to com-
mence June 1, 1987. However, the INS recognized several serious
problems, such as the failure to distribute the required forms and hand-
books to the over seven million businesses in time. As a consequence,
enforcement was postponed until July 1, 1987.64 For the first year, the
INS will only issue citations for the first offense.65 Thereafter, the full
range of penalties will apply for all violations. 66 After numerous com-
plaints arose that the regulations would unduly burden businesses, the
agency also agreed to require verification within three days for all new
hires, instead of twenty-four hours as previously required. 67
Confusion has also emerged regarding how the INS intends to en-
to obtain food or shelter. Employers are bearing the cost of enforcement because of the "growing
trend to shift the burden of enforcing social policy to the private sector of the economy .. " Id.
62 The proper documents include: a United States passport, citizenship certificate or naturaliza-
tion certificate; a foreign passport; an alien authorization card; or a combination of an employment
authorization document (i.e., social security account number card or United States birth certificate)
and an identity document (i.e., driver's license). 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1).
63 Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(i)(A)).
"Good faith" compliance is an affirmative defense to any allegations that the employer knew the
employee was an undocumented alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
64 Harvest, supra note 54; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(1); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,199 (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 210.1(b)); Simpson- Volstead-Mazzoli, Wall St. J., July 3, 1987, § 1, at 8, col. 1 (Midwest
ed.). The enforcement date, however, only applied to employers who hired workers after July 1,
1987. For employers who hired workers between the Act's enactment date (November 6, 1986) and
July 1, 1987, sanctions did not begin until September 1, 1987. See Employers Given to Sept. I to
Check Legality of Workers, Wall St. J., May 1, 1987, at 22, col. 3 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Employ-
ers Given to Sept 1].
65 Following receipt of a citation, employers are "subject to civil penalties even though the cita-
tion period has not expired." HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 86.
66 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(2). These federal penalties will preempt state and local sanction laws. Id.
§ 1324a(h)(2).
67 Employers Given to Sept. 1, supra note 64. A three day grace period presents a dilemma to
employers: the need for work to begin immediately versus the lack of time to produce and examine
the documents properly. Although not true in all cases, the probability is greater that such individu-
als are undocumented aliens. Nevertheless, not all United States citizens will have the proper docu-
ments on hand. "Many U.S. citizens don't carry around their.., birth certificates and would have
to obtain them before they could start work." Fees for Aliens Could Reach $250, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
Employers may be tempted to circumvent the Act's documentation requirement. By hiring
undocumented aliens as day laborers rather than creating long-term jobs, employers can use the
three day grace period to their advantage. The deterrent effect will be weakened because of the
difficulty in apprehending employers and workers during a brief employment period. Id.
United States Immigration Reform
8:503(1987)
force the provisions. In June 1987, the INS announced that enforcement
would be eased in with "'informational visits' to encourage voluntary
compliance with the law."68 In July 1987, the INS explained that it was
not ready to start enforcing the Act, but rather intended to remain in an
informational and educational mode.6 9 Then, two weeks later, the INS
announced that it would begin issuing citations to employers as early as
August 1987, but that it would focus on the blatant violators in order to
set a precedent.70 Rumors also circulated that employers could initially
expect a "modest enforcement presence" with only a "couple of hun-
dred" investigators.71
Employers, therefore, have not known whether the INS will be edu-
cating them or penalizing them. The only certainty at this point is that
Congress expects the INS to target its enforcement resources on repeat
offenders and to consider the size of the employer's workplace as a factor
in allocating such resources.72 The INS, therefore, intends to pursue
those who are in the best position to absorb the cost of any violations-
the large-scale employers.
Furthermore, employers are faced with several types of violations.
Minor violations include requiring employees to secure employers
against liability73 and more common "paperwork violations."'74 Major
violations consist of employment violations. As a penalty, the employer
must cease and desist from such practices and pay a civil penalty. 75 For
a pattern or practice of such violations, the employer must pay a criminal
penalty.76 Employers, however, are unsure of the best way to document
workers in order to protect themselves from these violations.
If the document "reasonably appears on its face to be genuine," em-
68 Immigration Law Will Be Enforced as of Wednesday, Wall St. J., June 29, 1987, at 26, col. 5
(Midwest ed.). This policy has been seen by some lawmakers as a misallocation of resources which
detracts from other enforcement initiatives. Half of all investigative resources are used to make these
visits. Plans to Phase in Immigration Law Hit by Lawmakers, Wall St. J., July 13, 1987, at 44, col. 1
(Midwest ed.). Other methods, such as "advertising campaigns and toll-free telephone answering
services," would be "more efficient." Id.
69 See Simpson-Volstead-Mazzoli, supra note 64.
70 Immigration Law's Enforcement Near, Commissioner Says, Wall St. J., July 21, 1987, at 18,
col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
71 New Immigration Law, supra note 45.
72 HousE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 86.
73 If an employer requires an applicant to post a bond or security as a guarantee against liability,
it will be subject to a civil penalty of $1,000. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(g)(1), (2).
74 "Paperwork violations" occur when an employer fails to comply with the employment verifi-
cation/record keeping system requirement. Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(B). Employers are subject to civil pen-
alties ranging from $100 to $1,000. Id. § 1324a(e)(5).
75 Civil penalties range from $250 to $2,000 per unauthorized alien for the first offense, and from
$2,000 to $5,000 for the second offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
76 Criminal penalties per unauthorized alien may reach $3,000, six months imprisonment, or
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ployers basically are protected from being fined." The Act does not re-
quire employers independently to verify that such documents are valid,7"
and it does not specify the amount of certainty required in examining the
documents. Any properly forged document could reasonably appear on
its face to be genuine.79 Nevertheless, the hope is that employers will
inspect papers more carefully. This complicated verification system,
however, leaves a large leeway for inadvertent mistakes, which, if found
and successfully prosecuted, will subject employers to fines.80
Furthermore, employers do not know whether they should retain
copies of the documents provided to them by the employees. Although
employer retention of document copies is not required by the INS,81 la-
bor authorities are divided as to whether it could demonstrate a good
faith effort to verify the employee, or whether it could reveal the docu-
ments as fakes.82
Most companies do not fully understand the documentation pro-
cess.83 Employers know of the new law, but they are unaware of the
"fine print."8 4 For example, many employers do not realize how expan-
both. Id. § 1324a(f)(1). In addition, the Attorney General may request a permanent or temporary
injunction or a restraining order in a district court. Id. § 1324a(f)(2).
The Senate version established a multi-tiered civil penalty structure: $100-$2,000 for the first
offense; $2,000-$5,000 for the second offense; and $3,000-$10,000 for "pattern or practice" viola-
tions; then criminal penalties of $3,000 and/or six months imprisonment for "pattern or practice"
violations following a civil fine. The House version established a two-tiered civil penalty structure:
$1,000-42,000 for the first offense; $2,000-45,000 for subsequent offenses; and criminal penalties of
$1,000 and/or six months imprisonment for "pattern or practice" violations. The Act is a modifica-
tion of the Senate version without a civil fine as a prerequisite to a criminal penalty. House CONF.
REP., supra note 7, at 86.
77 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1).
78 Workers' Status, supra note 46.
79 Uehling, supra note 11, at 32.
80 Any individual or entity may file a written complaint with respect to a potential employment
violation. After advanced notice, the Attorney General may impose a final unappealable order if the
employer does not request a hearing. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e)(1)(A), (3)(B). Upon request, however,
the employer is entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge. The administrative order
will be final unless: 1) the Attorney General substitutes his order as the final order; or 2) a person
adversely affected by the order files a petition in the Court of Appeals. Id. §§ 1324a(e)(3)(A)-(C),
(6)-(7).
81 Id. § 1324a(b)(4).
82 Immigration Cops: New Law Puts Task of Enforcement on Employer, Wall St. J., May 7,
1987, at 29, col. 4 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Immigration Cops].
83 Id. Exceptions do exist. Levi Strauss & Company, for example, has instituted its own am-
nesty-assistance program to help maintain employment in its plants in Texas and New Mexico.
Approximately 33% of its 10,000 workers in those locations are undocumented workers. New Im-
migration Law, supra note 45.
84 New Immigration Law, supra note 45 (statement of Rev. Gregory Boyle). The "fine print"
may be why some employers view the 1-9 form as just one more form to complete, while others see
the three day limit as a real hardship. Wall St. J., July 28, 1987, at 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.).
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sive the new law is. Most see the sanctions as a way for the government
to curtail the employment of menial unskilled labor in manufacturing
and service industries. They forget that the provisions apply equally to
foreign professional staff. Before the enactment of the law, visas "theo-
retically" were required upon hiring. Despite this, companies would hire
a foreign expert with the requisite skill but lacking a visa, put him or her
to work, and then apply for a visa without fear of sanctions.8 5
Now, the Act has transformed this "matter of routine personnel
processing to a vexing, often urgent, issue requiring ... a high level of
coordination among top management. ' 86  Most corporations, however,
are not prepared for or aware of this need, and it is especially urgent due
to the fact that the Act generally holds parent corporations responsible
for the violations of their subsidiaries or divisions." Thus, the only way
towards compliance will be for the documentation process to become a
routine management responsibility for every employer in the United
States.88 Until then, the administrative burden of the employer sanction
provisions will remain one of the most perplexing areas of the Act.
B. Labor Shortage
In addition to the administrative burden, employer sanctions have
produced an additional, though temporary, effect. Isolated labor
shortages, due to the loss of cheap labor resulting from the departure of
undocumented workers, are causing production cutbacks that could
eventually increase certain consumer prices and possibly cause economic
stagnation.89 Approximately 10% of the workers in the service indus-
85 Immigration Law May Alienate Your Foreign Professional Staff, Wall St. J., May 11, 1987, at
22, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
86 Id. For example, a major foreign company saw a carefully planned multi-million-dollar re-
search and marketing program jeopardized because 15 key executives and professionals with special-
ized knowledge had not yet obtained work visas." Id.
87 Id. An exception exists only if the subdivisions are distinct, physically separate, and do their
own hiring under their own control. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4).
88 "The only employers excluded are those who hire a worker for casual or sporadic labor, such
as babysitting." Immigration Cops, supra note 82. The Act does not exclude the government. Wall
St. J., May 15, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
Employers, however, might be able to lessen the burden of sanctions by hiring a labor contrac-
tor to supply the workers. Labor contractors who recruit or refer for a fee must verify the legal
authorization of those actually hired and therefore carry the burden of verification and sanctions
(this burden, however, can be shifted to the employer if it consents). If the employer "knows" the
alien is undocumented, the employer still is subject to fines. Immigration Cops, supra note 82; see 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(4).
89 New Immigration Law, supra note 45; Immigration Amnesty Begins, supra note 49. Congress
"open[ed] the lid to a full Pandora's box of unforeseen problems when it tamper[ed] with the laws of
supply and demand .... Harvest, supra note 54.
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tries, especially textiles and restaurants, are affected. 90 For example, in
California a garment factory owner has reported a loss of one-third of his
workers. Another employer's plant was running at only 45% capacity
and faced millions of dollars in lost revenue.9 1
As predicted, the greatest burden of the sanctions inevitably fell
upon the United States manufacturing industries. Of the 2.1 minion un-
documented aliens who were present in the United States (60% of whom
entered from Mexico), 1.9 million of them were employed. Forty percent
of those employed worked in the manufacturing industry, while about
25% of those employed worked in business, repair, or personal
services.
92
Undocumented aliens fall into one of two categories: unskilled or
skilled. Unskilled undocumented aliens make up the bulk of a labor pool
of low-skilled persons who are willing to work for low wages at undesir-
able jobs. They often fill a large regional or metropolitan demand for
labor.93 Many of these workers remain in the United States temporarily
producing a statistic known as circular migration.9" Skilled undocu-
mented aliens, on the other hand, tend to receive higher wages. They
include workers in the building trades as well as professionals and visa
overstayers.9 ' The employer sanction provisions affected each group
differently.
Many skilled workers are eligible for amnesty. Those who are ineli-
gible will face the same alternatives as the unskilled aliens. Any shortage
arising from skilled workers leaving their jobs will not cause an increase
in wages for these jobs because the jobs will be filled by domestic
workers.
Due to the transitory nature of the unskilled aliens, however, the
majority are not eligible for amnesty. The ineligible unskilled aliens may
be deported or forced to seek employment in one of the agricultural
90 Harvest, supra note 54.
91 Id.; New Immigration Law, supra note 45. Employers have requested referrals from state
unemployment agencies and have run newspaper ads, but to little avail. Id. It has been estimated
that about 2,000,000 people have crossed the Rio Grande River back to Mexico after being fired
north of the border. Harvest, supra note 54. Unfortunately, due to the confusion about the new law,
some employers laid off workers even though they were hired before November 6, 1986, and there-
fore could not be prosecuted. Scrambling to Cope with New Law on Immigration, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1986, at 2, col. I (nat'1 ed.).
92 See Census and Population, supra note 10, at 148. The other major sector is the agriculture
industry; see infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
93 Passels & Woodrow, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: Estimates of Un-
documented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 642, 643 (1984).
94 See P. CAFFERTY, supra note 10, at 104.
95 See id. at 78.
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worker programs. Either outcome will result in a shortage of unskilled
workers, and create a hole that must be filled by domestic workers de-
manding higher wages.
This labor shortage in the business community may be a signal that
the employer sanctions are acting as successful deterrents. However, it
can be argued that the sanctions may not be successful, and the labor
shortage will only be temporary.96 Until then, many service and manu-
facturing industries will be faced with a labor shortage crisis which may
adversely affect United States businesses and cause economic conse-
quences abroad.
V. TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAMS
The temporary agricultural worker programs specified in the Act
were a concession to corporate farming interests who wanted a depend-
able and cheap supply of farmworkers to help them stay afloat and com-
pete with foreign growers.97 The farmers believed that these provisions
were vital to counter the effects of the amnesty and employer sanctions.98
The Act created three programs: an H-2A agricultural worker pro-
gram, a special agricultural worker program, and a replenishment agri-
cultural worker program. The H-2A agricultural worker program is an
expansion of the existing H-2 agricultural worker program under which
employers hire undocumented aliens to perform temporary or seasonal
agricultural labor only when there is an insufficient number of legal
workers available. 99 The special agricultural worker program provides
for the admission of, and possible legal status for, up to 350,000 special
agricultural workers to perform seasonal agricultural work in perishable
commodities."°° Finally, the replenishment agricultural worker program
will admit foreign workers to perform seasonal agricultural work in per-
ishable commodities on the basis of need triggered by a determination
96 See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
97 Wilentz, supra note 30, at 28; Uehling, supra note 11, at 35.
98 Wilentz, supra note 30, at 28. It was estimated that some 300,000 undocumented workers
were employed, mostly on a seasonal basis, on farms and ranches. Farmers argued that employer
sanctions would cause them to refrain from hiring these undocumented workers due to the risks of
economic loss. Similarly, farmers argued that those workers who were successful in achieving am-
nesty were unlikely to remain as seasonal workers on farms. For the aliens to live here permanently,
as opposed to returning to their native lands during the off seasons, year-round employment would
be required. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1200 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 176-77 (1985)[hereinafter Senate Hearings](statement of Henry Voss, President, California
Farm Bureau).
99 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186(a)-(i).
100 Id. §§ 1160(a)-(h).
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that a shortage of special agricultural workers exists.101
These programs have had difficulty succeeding. In June 1987 the
INS relaxed its procedures in order to allow migrant workers to enter the
United States to pick perishable crops because of farm labor shortages in
the western states. 102 The problem: crops were rotting because special
agricultural workers were held up by the regulations. 0 3 The government
had received only 11,300 applications for special ninety day work per-
mits, which were far below their 200,000 estimate.'" The INS blamed
this failure on farmers who did not gear up for the change. The farmers
argued that the paperwork was too inflexible and slow for the changing
needs of perishable crops. 10 5
The program has deterred potential workers. In order to apply for
the program, workers must pay a $185 processing fee. Their spouses and
children are not protected from deportation. 0 6 Moreover, the risk of the
worker's being jailed or deported is high once a worker's temporary per-
mit expires. Other workers have avoided the program because the new
plan stirs memories of the Braceros Program, in which Mexican workers
imported to offset labor shortages during World War II were subjected to
fumigation and other humiliations. 10 7
Before the relaxed procedures were implemented, an alien could ad-
just to temporary residence status during an eighteen month period only
if he or she were admissible as an immigrant. The alien also needed to
reside in and perform seasonal agricultural services in the perishable
commodities industry in the United States for at least ninety days during
a twelve month period.'018 He or she then could adjust to permanent
101 Id. §§ 1161(a)-(g).
102 Immigration Rules Eased so Migrants Can Harvest Crops, Wall St. J., June 30, 1987, at 21, col.
I (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Immigration Rules Eased].
103 Id. In Northern California, for example, cherries were rotting off the branches, and labor
contractors were short hundreds of workers. Thus overripe produce was sold as lower priced by-
products. New Immigration Law, supra note 45. Similarly, in Oregon it was estimated that some
regions had two-thirds of their jobs vacant, causing large portions of crops (especially strawberries)
to rot. Id.
104 Immigration Rules Eased, supra note 102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a). The shortage of applica-
tions persisted even after the INS made two extensions for alien farm workers to apply for special
worker status. Originally they were required to apply before November 6, 1986. The time limit was
then extended to May 1, 1987, and finally to June 26, 1987. Employers Given to Sept 1, supra note
64; Immigration Rules Eased, supra note 102.
105 Immigration Rules Eased, supra note 102.
106 Simpson- Volstead-Mazzoli, supra note 64; 52 Fed. Reg. 16,193 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.7(b)).
107 New Immigration Law, supra note 45.
108 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1). Continuous residence is not required; rather, six months per year in
the aggregate is the minimum. HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 96.
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residence status after one or two years.109
It is doubtful that even the relaxation of these procedures will signi-
ficantly impact problem areas. The new rules allow aliens to obtain these
work permits without first having to provide documentation of previous
employment in the United States, as was required by the Act." 0
Although the workers may begin working, they will still have to provide
documents within the ninety day period in order to qualify for special
agricultural worker status."' Thus, the workers will be faced with the
same risk of deportation and the same processing fees.
Farmers, aware that the relaxed procedures will not end the labor
shortage, have instituted actions of their own to obtain workers. Some
growers have flown to Mexico to recruit workers, while others have
raised wages as much as 8%. Oregon tried to get media in Southern
California to publicize the need for workers. A commercial airline even
received a proposal from one southern state to sell United States vaca-
tions to foreigners who would spend part of their holiday filling jobs left
by undocumented workers.112
Nevertheless, growers argue that only the implementation of an un-
structured, flexible free market system will be successful in ensuring that
perishable goods are harvested.113 Previously, workers followed the har-
vesting of each of the many perishable crops as they ripened in a south-
to-north path and were not restricted to a particular grower (as is the
case under the H-2 programs).114 Unfortunately, it is impossible to pre-
dict with any degree of certainty when crops will be ripe; a delay of even
a few days could make the difference to an unexpected harvest time.
109 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(2). If more than 350,000 aliens meet these requirements, an adjustment is
granted on a first come-first served basis. Id. § 1160(a)(2)(C). Proof of eligibility includes records
supplied by employers or collective bargaining programs or other reliable documents. Id.
§ 1160(b)(3).
Proof of eligibility, however, is governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act case law. In a line of
cases leading from Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), "courts have dealt
with fact patterns involving employee loss of records, destruction or falsification of records by em-
ployers, and other difficult circumstances where precise evidence of hours worked is lacking."
HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 97. This problem is compounded in agriculture because pay
records may only show piece rate units completed. Therefore, although evidence of hours worked is
required, fairness dictates a presumption created in favor of worker evidence. If an alien is able to
produce evidence showing only piece rate units picked, then any day where such work was per-
formed shall satisfy the workday requirements of this Act. Id.
110 Immigration Rules Eased, supra note 102; see 8 U.S.C. l160(a)(1)(B).
111 Immigration Rules Eased, supra note 102. The relaxed procedures only apply to immigrants
seeking to enter the United States. Id.
112 New Immigration Law, supra note 45.
113 Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 184 (statement of Michael V. Durando, President, Califor-
nia Grape and Tree Fruit League, Farm Labor Alliance).
114 Id. at 186.
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"[T]here is extreme volatility in demand under normal circumstances,
not to speak of what happens during a weather emergency." '1 15 In an
emergency there would not be time to produce the necessary paperwork
and means of travel.' 1
6
These programs do not provide growers with the flexibility to assure
that they can secure enough workers in time to harvest the perishable
crops. According to Michael Durando, President of the Farm Labor Al-
liance, "[f]resh fruit and vegetable farmers are suffering the same eco-
nomic pressures as the rest of United States agriculture, and we simply
cannot afford to gamble on a program that does not have that kind of
flexibility." '117 Thus, while farmers were successful in obtaining pro-
grams intended to counter the effects of employer sanctions and amnesty,
the perishable commodities industries have suffered due to the inflexibil-
ity of the programs.
VI. TEMPORARY SUCCESS
The labor shortages in the service and manufacturing industries and
the agricultural sector do not exemplify the success of employer sanc-
tions. Rather, they mark a temporary lull in undocumented immigration
that will end once the demand for labor in the United States and the push
of poverty and political upheaval in foreign countries overcome any fear
of evading the law. In fact, the temporary lull in undocumented immi-
gration has already begun to turn around. After a seven month decline
ending in June 1987, undocumented immigration is on the rise." 8 This
surge has led many "to speculate that growing Latin American poverty
has overpowered the new law's disincentive to immigrate illegally,"
which has coincided "with the widespread reports of labor shortages in
[United States] farm fields and garment factories." 119
These facts are not coincidental; they result from problems in the
Act's implementation. Aliens are willing to take risks because of eco-
nomic and political factors in their own countries. 120 Similarly, when
crops are rotting or service and manufacturing businesses are negatively
115 Id. at 189, 190-92.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 193.
118 Illegal Immigration Seems to Rebound, Fueling Doubts About New Law's Impact, Wall St. J.,
July 7, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (Midwest ed.). Previously, undocumented immigration was in sharp de-
cline, and border arrests were down 50%. In June 1987, the number of apprehensions was up 33%
over May. Id. Other factors that might have contributed to the previous decrease include: in-
creased border violence and the fact that the Rio Grande River (the Texas-Mexico border) was
flowing at its highest level in 45 years, discouraging crossings. Id.
119 Id.
120 The death of 18 Mexicans in a boxcar in July 1987 symbolizes this reality. Id.
United States Immigration Reform
8:503(1987)
affected, United States employers may risk paying fines. In the long run,
the law cannot stop the simple economics of supply and demand. 21
A basic problem in implementing the Act is that the INS will not be
able to seal the United States' southern border, due to its physical length.
While most countries have immigration controls at their borders, they do
not share a 2,000 mile permeable southern border with the country from
which most undocumented aliens come.12 2 The size of the current Bor-
der Patrol numbers in the hundreds to cover these 2,000 miles. A thou-
sand persons, even assisted by sensing devices, would probably not be
effective due to the vast size of the border.123 Similar physical problems
exist along the northern border, but the United States has paid little at-
tention to it.124 Border enforcement, no matter how sophisticated, can-
not stop undocumented immigration. The INS faces a losing battle.
VII. LEGAL ISSUES
A wide spectrum of legal issues and litigation has developed which
will hinder implementation of the Act, with repercussions both in the
United States and abroad.' 25 The Act affects seven million employers
and an estimated two to four million undocumented immigrants, leaving
many "high stake" issues to be solved.12 6 These issues include: 1) separa-
tion of alien families if all members do not qualify for amnesty; 2) em-
ployer termination of undocumented workers seeking legalization; 3)
technicalities of legalization; 4) confidentiality of the process; 5) equal
protection and due process concerns of aliens infected with Acquired Im-
121 As the baby boom generation ages, there are fewer United States citizens between the ages of
15 and 29 (especially in entry level jobs), thus exacerbating the labor shortage. Immigration May
Fill Labor Gap, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 27, col. 3 (Midwest ed.). The future demand for labor
will be another driving force for immigration, both legal and illegal. Id.
122 S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, "TEMPORARY" ALIEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 92
(1982).
123 Id. There is some theoretical number of Border Patrol personnel that could effectively shield
the border against clandestine entry. However, such shielding would be prohibitively expensive and
would adversely affect the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Id.
124 p. CAFFERTY, supra note 10, at 173. There is a well-organized pipeline for smuggling un-
documented Chinese entrants through British Columbia. The Canadian provinces of Ontario and
Quebec are also reported to provide crossing points for many undocumented entrants from Europe
and the Caribbean. Id. at 173-74. Aliens cross by land and sea, and there are also visa overstayers.
Id.
125 Attorneys appear to be the chief beneficiaries of the Act. The Act is said to have created an
"immigration industry," for it "is at once a labor law, a civil-rights act and a de facto declaration of
U.S. foreign policy." Immigration Reform Provides a Fertile Field for Lawyers, Wall St. J., July 14,
1987, at I, col. I (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Fertile Field].
126 With confusion widespread, however, employers and immigrants have become targets for
profiteering, civil rights crusading, and fraud. Id.
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mune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"); 2 7 and 6) fourth amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches at places of employment.' 28
Other important issues stem from the implementation of the anti-
discrimination provisions, which were established to lessen the discrimi-
natory impact of employer sanctions.129 Basically, the provisions make it
unlawful for an employer, with at least four employees, to discriminate
against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) in employment.
The discrimination provisions cover hiring, recruiting, referring for a fee,
or discharging an individual because of his or her national origin. 30 Cer-
tain civil rights groups are already active in documenting abuses of these
provisions, hoping ultimately to achieve the repeal of employer
sanctions. 3'
Debates have begun over the scope of the provisions. Will the provi-
sions apply in unforeseen ways, such as the failure of an employer to ask
"Anglo-appearing" applicants for proof of residency while requesting the
same of foreign-appearing applicants? 132 The anti-discrimination provi-
127 The United States Justice Department currently has the authority to keep aliens out of the
country if they have Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). However, it also wants
authority to deport undocumented aliens infected with the disease and is considering asking Con-
gress for such authority. Congressional approval is necessary because the Act prohibits the deporta-
tion of undocumented aliens residing in the United States "based on any information-including the
results of AIDS tests-provided to the government as part of an application for citizenship." Ad-
ministration May Seek Authority to Deport Illegal Aliens with Aids, Wall St. J., June 9, 1987, at 56,
col. 1 (Midwest ed.).
If Congress grants such authority, the rights of aliens who do meet the test for permanent
residency would be at issue. If Congress does not grant such authority, these aliens' rights would
still be at issue because the current Attorney General intends "to deny permanent legal status to
aliens who test positive for AIDS." Id.
128 Fertile Field, supra note 125. If the INS gives three days warning, it will not need a subpoena
or search warrant. If it has "probable cause" to believe the employer is violating the law, it can enter
without a warning after obtaining a subpoena or search warrant. Id.
129 HOUSE CONF. REP., supra note 7, at 87. The provisions broaden "the Title VII protections
against national origin discrimination" due to the concern that foreign appearing individuals might
be made more vulnerable by the imposition of sanctions. There is "some concern that some employ-
ers may decide not to hire 'foreign' appearing individuals to avoid sanctions." Id.
130 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324b(a)(l)-(3).
131 Double Bind: Employers Who Shun Illegals Risk Discrimination Charges, Wall St. J., June 5,
1987, at 8, col. 2 (Midwest ed.)[hereinafter Double Bind]. For example, as of June 1987 over 350
immigration-related complaints had been filed with the California, Illinois, and Texas offices of the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, a Latino civil rights group. Id.
The repeal of the employer sanctions could possibly occur if the civil rights groups succeed in
their challenges. The General Accounting Office will make three reports analyzing whether the
provisions are being carried out satisfactorily, whether a pattern of employment discrimination exists
against United States citizens, nationals, or eligible workers, especially on the basis of national ori-
gin, and whether an unnecessary regulatory burden is being imposed on employers. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(j). If negative results are reported, Congress has the authority to repeal the employer sanc-
tion provisions as well as the antidiscrimination provisions. Id. §§ 1324a(k)-(n).
132 Double Bind, supra note 131.
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sions prohibit discrimination on the basis of national origin or citizen-
ship, but allow an employer to show a preference for hiring citizens over
documented aliens if the applicants are equally qualified.1 33 These issues
will remain unsolved, however, until the United States Department of
Justice defines the legal test of discrimination. The United States govern-
ment proposes that proof of intent to discriminate should be required,
while civil rights groups prefer the "traditional EEOC [Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission] standard of proving that hiring practices
have a discriminatory effect." 134 A relaxed test can pose potential
problems to innocent employers.
These are only some of the issues that have surfaced with respect to
the Act. More are bound to arise. In the meantime, as United States
citizens and foreigners face these issues, the achievement of the Act's
goals will be hindered.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Through its four main components, employer sanctions, amnesty,
agricultural worker programs, and increased enforcement, the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 attempted to establish a system of
control on immigration. However, the Act negatively affected foreign
policy relations with Latin America and Canada. These countries took
affirmative action to lessen the impact of the Act on their countries. The
Act has also fallen short of expectations for amnesty, and implementa-
tion of employer sanctions has proved problematic.
Furthermore, the Act has created labor shortages in certain business
and agricultural sectors, reflecting a temporary lull in undocumented im-
migration which will terminate once the laws of supply, demand, and
desperation equalize. The legal arena will challenge and define the Act's
intent and scope, with potential negative impact upon its effectiveness.
Congress required General Accounting Office reports on the imple-
mentation of the Act, so regular information will be available on which
to base revisions.1 35  After the initial impact has been assessed, the
133 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4). Employers may proceed with less fear of a discrimination charge
under this powerful defense. As long as a competitor is present, the employer need not choose the
individual who appears foreign. The decision not to take a chance that even a fifth generation Mexi-
can-American is a citizen can thus be legally defended. A foreign appearance or surname might be
used by employers to disqualify citizens and legal resident aliens from jobs. P. CAFFERTY, supra
note 10, at 187. The burden would then shift to the individual to prove that he or she was more
qualified than his or her competitor.
134 Double Bind, supra note 131.
135 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:503(1987)
United States Government once again will have the opportunity to ad-
dress the concerns raised in the first year of the Act's existence.
Pamela D. Nichols
